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MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S STANDING
Gary C. Leedes*
Some may lament the results of Mr. Justice Powell's attempts to
clarify the law of standing. Indeed, public interest lawyers who ad-
vocate granting standing on a surrogate basis to individuals who are
members of a large unorganized class of diffuse interests have cause
to complain about a return to a more orthodox conception of stand-
ing.' However, Mr. Justice Powell has a different outlook, viz., in a
democratic society, a federal court is not necessarily an appropriate
or the most effective institution to redress the grievances of people
upset by alleged lawless government action.
The Justice has labored to produce a sound and logical test which
is suitable to assess the adequacy of a plaintiff's stake in a contro-
versy. It is my purpose to evaluate whether the Powellian test is an
appropriate, neutral and principled way to screen out improper
plaintiffs.2
Justice Powell took an active role in writing the Court's standing
opinions after the Court had relaxed plaintiff access barriers to the
point where some questioned if a personalized injury in fact was still"a core constitutional ingredient of the standing requirement." '3 As
a result of Powell's efforts, it is now clear that (1) the plaintiff must
aver that his injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant officials, and that (2) the order he seeks, if granted, is
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1960; LL.B., Temple University, 1962; LL.M., Harvard
University, 1973. Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School.
1. Recently a headline in the New York Times charged: "Law Deans Say Justices Grant
Access to Bench to Groups They Favor but Deny it to Others." N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1976,
at 31, col. 1.
The article reported that the board of governors of the Society of American Law Teachers
cited two cases, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org'n, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976), as "rulings on procedural issues that curtailed access to
courts [which are] a serious concern of civil liberties and and public interest lawyers. .. ."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1976, at 31, col. 1. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1305 (1976).
2. The test screens out plaintiffs who do not meet the "cases and controversies" require-
ment of article HI of the United States Constitution or who for prudential reasons lack
standing. For a discussion of these prudential considerations see notes 36-45 infra and accom-
panying text.
3. G. GUNTHER, CONSTrTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1562 (9th ed. 1975).
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likely to provide him with meaningful relief.4 Moreover, if the plain-
tiff's injury is the indirect result of alleged lawless action, the plain-
tiff's burden (to establish the requisite causal injury, and the effec-
tiveness of the relief requested) is substantially heavier.'
For Powell, the law of standing, like the doctrine of ripeness,6 has
a constitutional dimension (but prudential considerations also oper-
ate to bar access to improper plaintiffs).' Although the standing
question focuses on plaintiffs, not issues, the majority of the Justices
now shares Justice Powell's view that not every injury sustained by
a plaintiff presents issues that are justiciable. The plaintiff's injury,
at the very least, must be distinct,8 remediable and a consequence
of lawless official action. Thus, even Congress cannot confer stand-
ing upon anyone to sue as a private attorney-general in order to
vindicate the public interest Quite to the contrary, a plaintiff who
sues pursuant to an act of Congress which confers standing must
demonstrate with specificity that he has sustained an article Il
injury.10 However, before the Powellian approach can be analyzed
in proper perspective, it is first necessary to evaluate the cases that
had weakened traditional standing barriers.
Flast v. Cohen"
The plaintiff was a federal taxpayer who challenged a federal
statute which provided financial aid to religious schools. The plain-
tiff claimed the statute violated the religion clauses of the first
amendment. The Court held that plaintiff taxpayer had standing to
sue because the establishment clause operated as a specific consti-
tutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of its taxing and
4. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org'n, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
5. Id. at 1927-28; See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975).
6. Id. at 499 n.10. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 190 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring).
7. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975).
8. The Court has noted that "[a] plaintiff must allege some particular injury that sets
him apart from the man on the street." United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
9. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org'n, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1921-25 (1976).
10. Id.
11. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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spending powers. The Court laid down a novel two-step test to de-
termine if federal taxpayers met its standing requirements. The first
step of this test was to determine if the federal taxpayer had status
qua taxpayer to challenge the statute.12 The second step was to
determine whether the plaintiff had established a nexus between his
taxpayer's status and the nature of the alleged constitutional in-
fringement.'"
In applying this test to the plaintiff in Flast, the Court held he
had status since he challenged an exercise by Congress of its consti-
tutional power to spend for the general welfare. Hence, plaintiff
established a logical link between his status as a taxpayer and the
type of power exercised by Congress." Chief Justice Warren's opin-
ion explains that a federal taxpayer has status qua taxpayer only if
the statute he attacks is an exercise of power under the taxing and
spending clauses of the Constitution.'5 Conversely, a federal tax-
payer would not have status qua taxpayer if the statute he attacks
is an exercise of one of Congress' delegated powers other than the
taxing and spending power. For example, if pursuant to its com-
merce clause power Congress enacts a statute which benefits reli-
gious schools, a federal taxpayer would not have status to challenge
that law according to a literal reading of Flast. Nor would a taxpayer
have status to attack a regulatory statute which requires for its
enforcement an expenditure of the government's tax funds."6 Ob-
viously, the class of federal taxpayers who have status is not very
broad, being limited by the nature of the power Congress exercises.
If the taxpayer meets the requirements of the status test, he still
must pass a "nexus" test." What Chief Justice Warren meant by
the nexus test is this: Not all infringements of the Constitution can
be challenged by a federal taxpayer with status; instead, only viola-
tions of specific prohibitions on Congress' taxing and spending
power can be challenged.'" The tenth amendment and the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment were regarded by Warren as
12. Id. at 105-06.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 102.
15. U.S. CoNs. art. I, § 8.
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
17. Id. at 102-03.
18. Id.
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general rather than specific prohibitions.'" Thus, a federal taxpayer
cannot challenge a spending program on the ground that it violates
the due process clause or the reserved powers of the states. Such
infringements of the Constitution are not specific prohibitions
within the meaning of Flast. Indeed, no specific prohibitions on
Congress' spending and taxing power besides the establishment
clause of the Constitution have been identified."0 In retrospect, the
Flast opinion can be seen as an experiment by the Court trying to
retreat from the traditional rigid standing barriers without being
sure how far it should go. 21
Justice Powell, echoing the view of Mr. Justice Harlan,22 has dem-
onstrated by force of argument the unsuitability of the Flast test as
a gauge to measure whether plaintiffs have an adequate stake in
controversies.? Justice Powell, as Justice Harlan contended before
him, 4 argues that a taxpayer's interest in the subject matter of any
given case does not become more or less adequate because it is a
taxing and spending statute he has challenged rather than a regula-
tory statute. Nor does the adequacy of the taxpayer's interest vary
depending on which constitutional provision is allegedly violated, or
how specific or general it might be. The Flast test does not relate
to "concrete adverseness. '' 25 Thus Powell disparages the test as nei-
ther a sound nor logical limitation on standing.26
The Court's application of the Flast test in United States v.
Richardson illustrated the doctrinal confusion that worried Powell.
Richardson was a taxpayer who had attempted to get detailed infor-
mation regarding the expenditures of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). His attempt was unsuccessful because the officials
refused to disclose the information owing to their interpretation of
19. Id. at 105.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 183 n.2 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring), citing
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HAv. L. REV. 645, 661
(1973).
22. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 121-30 (1918) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180-85 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).
24. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 121-30 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 182 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 184.
27. Id. at 171-75.
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the pertinent statute. Richardson brought an action as a taxpayer,
alleging that certain provisions of the statute which authorized
withholding the information violated the Constitution. 2 The Court
held that Richardson lacked standing to bring the action." Richard-
son had not established a logical link between his status as a tax-
payer and the type of enactment challenged.3 1 The Court explained
that his challenge was not addressed to the taxing or spending power
but to what was essentially a regulatory statute.12 Furthermore, Ri-
chardson had not claimed that funds were being spent in violation
of any specific constitutional limitation upon the taxing or spending
power.33 Of course, Richardson could not, in good faith, make such
a claim because the detailed information he sought was needed to
verify any allegation of improper expenditures. Indeed, his injury
was his inability to get the information; an injury which he claimed
interfered with his duty to monitor the actions of Congress and the
executive branch of government .3 The Court dismissed this injury
as a kind of generalized grievance not suitable to give Richardson
an adequate stake in the controversy.35
Justice Powell concurred in the opinion of the Court because he
agreed Richardson's injury was not particularized enough.36 But
Justice Powell stressed that constitutional limitations were not the
only relevant considerations. 37 He enumerated several prudential
reasons why it would be inappropriate for the Court to dilute the
requirement of a particularized injury. For example, he noted it
28. See 50 U.S.C. § 403 (b)(1949).
29. The plaintiff alleged that the withholding of such information violated the seventh
clause of article I, section 9 of the U.S. Constitution, which states:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
30. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 175.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 176. Richardson also claimed he could not "properly fulfill his obligations as a
member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking national office." Id.
35. Id. at 176-80. See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974).
36. Id. at 190-95.
37. Id. at 185.
1977]
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would be awkward in a democratic society for non-elected judges to
supervise the representative branches of government merely
because a taxpayer requested a district court to grant him relief .3
Aside from depriving the elected branches from serving, with courts,
as the ultimate guardians of liberty, 39 the allowance of unrestrained
public actions would produce uneven and sporadic review of varying
quality depending on the resources of the particular plaintiff.' An-
other prudential consideration was Justice Powell's concern that
Congress might exercise its power to curb the use of judicial power. ',
Justice Powell also expressed concern that wholesale judicial recep-
tivity to public interest suits by persons who cannot distinguish
themselves from other citizens risks impairment of the federal
court's effectiveness in protecting the personal rights and liberties
of individuals and minority groups. 2 According to Justice Powell,
the prudent use of the federal judicial power is "incompatible with
unlimited notions of taxpayer and citizen standing. '4 3 In short,
Powell perceived the need to confine the federal courts to their
"properly limited" sphere." That sphere of limited judicial power,
since Marbury v. Madison,45 is to decide constitutional questions as
an incidental by-product of traditional cases and controversies. In
the traditional case the plaintiff had to allege how the defendant
injured him in some distinct and concrete way. The Richardson
concurrence was the starting point for the evolution of the Powellian
test in standing cases.
The Administrative Procedure Act Cases
Subsequent to the Flast decision, the Warren Court found an-
other avenue to travel in its quest to lower barriers blocking access
to persons seeking review of federal administrative agency action.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)46 was susceptible to an
interpretation that afforded many more "adversely affected or ag-
38. Id. at 188-89, 196-97.
39. Id. at 189.
40. Id. at 190.
41. Id. at 191.
42. Id. at 192.
43. Id. at 191.
44. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
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grieved"4 7 persons access to federal courts. The pertinent provisions
are as follows:
This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to
the extent that-
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 8
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.49
These provisions permitting judicial review of agency action ena-
bled the plaintiff in Association of Data Processing Service Organi-
zations, Inc. v. Camp,5" to challenge the validity of a ruling made
by the Comptroller of the Currency. The Comptroller, whose duty
inter alia is to regulate national banks, issued a ruling that permit-
ted national banks to compete with the plaintiff's members. The
plaintiff's complaint sought relief on the theory that the marketing
of data processing services by national banks is illegal, and that the
Comptroller's approval was an arbitrary abuse of discretion in ex-
cess of statutory authority. The district court held the plaintiff had
no standing to redress the economic injury of its members.5 ' The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.2 The plaintiff
argued it had standing because Congress, when it enacted the Bank
Service Corporation Act, evinced a specific legislative purpose to
protect the competitive interests of commercial data processors
against national bank competition.53 Moreover, the plaintiff as-
serted it had standing to challenge the action of the Comptroller by
virtue of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act .5 The Gov-
ernment argued the opposite, contending the purpose of the Bank
Service Corporation Act was neither to create nor to protect legal
rights of the plaintiff and that only the competitive interests of the
47. See id. § 702.
48. Id. § 701(a).
49. Id. § 702.
50. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
51. 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
52. 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
53. See Brief for Appellant, 25 L. Ed. 2d 884, 884-85 (1970).
54. Id.
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national banks were protected. 5 The Court attempted to wrestle
with the standing issue without implicating the merits." It held the
Administrative Procedure Act did confer standing because the
plaintiff alleged the challenged action caused him injury in fact, and
because competitors with national banks are arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the relevant statute.57 As Justice Pow-
ell later noted, the plaintiff's injury was "directly traceable to the
action of the defendant federal official, for it complained of injurious
competition that would have been illegal without that action."5
The injury-in-fact test of Data Processing is just the first step in
the Court's bi-partite inquiry concerning what persons fit the APA's
description of persons "adversely affected or aggrieved within the
meaning of a relevant statute." If a plaintiff's injury is not the result
of a common law wrong, he must point to a statute (or constitutional
provision) other than the APA which arguably protects or regulates
that particular interest adversely affected by the defendant's chal-
lenged action. The Court in Data Processing did not explain and has
yet to explain how a plaintiff could meet this requirement. It is
therefore uncertain at this time how much bite the zone-of-interest
test has. If the plaintiff's burden is merely to argue his general
interests are protected or regulated by some arguably relevant stat-
ute, and the Court agrees without checking the legislative history,
and without discussing the purposes of the statute, then the test is
a superfluous and meaningless appendage to the injury-in-fact re-
quirement. The zone-of-interest inquiry would be meaningless be-
cause it would add nothing of substance to the injury-in-fact in-
quiry. On the other hand, if the zone-of-interest test is interpreted
strictly or is used to warrant the application of prudential considera-
tions which screen out plaintiffs, this would enable judges to deny
access to plaintiffs who have sustained distinct and palpable inju-
ries that allegedly result from challenged official action.59
In Barlow v. Collins,"0 the Court's loose handling of the zone-of-
55. Id.
56. 397 U.S. at 156.
57. Id.
58. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org'n, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1927-28 n.25 (1976).
59. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 22.02-1, 22.02-5
(1976).
60. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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interest test aroused suspicions that the search for a protective legis-
lative intent was largely a fiction." These suspicions blossomed into
reasonable doubts when in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,62 and in
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 3 the Court required still
less of a showing of the plaintiff's particularized interests protected
by a relevant statute. Indeed, "the Court afforded relief without
inquiring into whether the plaintiff had a protected legal interest." 4
Thereafter the Court dramatically relaxed the injury-in-fact in-
quiry in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.).65 Significantly, in this most outstanding
example of the Court's relaxation of traditional standing barriers,
Mr. Justice Powell did not participate in the consideration of the
S. C.R.A.P. case or its decision.
S.C.R.A.P., an unincorporated association, on behalf of its
members, challenged an order of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) that permitted the railroads to collect a surcharge. The
plaintiff alleged the ICC order was illegal because the agency failed
to file an environmental impact statement6 pursuant to the Na-
tional Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). 6 Arguably, NEPA
requires all agencies of the federal government, including the ICC,
to file an environmental impact statement whenever their actions
significantly affect the quality of the human environment.
S.C.R.A.P.'s theory in the case was that its members used camping,
hiking and fishing areas around Washington, D.C., and their enjoy-
ment of such areas would be disturbed by the "illegal" rate in-
crease. 8 The Court was asked to accept the following line of causa-
tion as a demonstration of plaintiff's "direct" stake in the contro-
versy:
61. See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 645, 662-66 (1973); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inade-
quate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 471 (1974)[hereinafter cited as
Standing to Challenge].
62. 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
63. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
64. Standing to Challenge, supra note 61, at 471.
65. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
66. 412 U.S. at 679.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(1970).
68. 412 U.S. at 682.
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[A] general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of
nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus
resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such
goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington
area, and resulting in more refuse that might be discarded in national
parks in the Washington area. 9
The controversial issue was whether such a relatively insubstantial,
non-economic threat based on a tenuous theory of causation was
sufficient for standing. The Court held that the district court was
correct in denying the government's motion to dismiss for failure to
allege sufficient standing." In dissent, Mr. Justice White com-
plained the injuries were "remote, speculative and insubstantial,"
and as generalized as any concerned citizen's interest in challenging
government action.' As Professor Albert has remarked, "The
major difficulty in S.C.R.A.P. stems from the attempt to isolate
injury for threshold adjudication"72 without even tangentially con-
sidering the merits. This "produces confusion and piecemeal litiga-
tion."73
The Court did not intend to dispense with the injury-in-fact re-
quirement when it held that S.C.R.A.P. had standing to sue. The
majority opinion took pains to point out that S.C.R.A.P was not
merely a concerned bystander seeking to vindicate its value prefer-
ences. It was not a bystander because S.C.R.A.P., on behalf of its
members, alleged a specific and perceptible injury.74 Although the
threatened harm was relatively trifling in nature, the harm was
different in kind from a purely ideological injury.
S. C.R.A.P., at the moment, is still law insofar as the Court con-
tinues to recognize relatively minor injuries of a non-economic
nature as sometimes sufficient to meet article III requirements so
long as the litigant suffers a specific and perceptible harm. How-
ever, it is doubtful that the Court will continue to accept at face
value conclusory allegations which establish only a very weak line
69. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 690.
71. Id. at 723 (White, J., dissenting in part).
72. See Standing to Challenge, supra note 61, at 490 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 491.
74. Id. at 688-89.
75. Id. at 689 n.14.
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of causation between wrongful act and injury. The allegations in
S.C.R.A.P. merely demonstrated a potential invasion of the plain-
tiffs legally protected interests which required the Court to specu-
late as to what might occur. S.C.R.A.P. was the culmination of the
movement away from traditional standing and case and controversy
requirements and toward the public interest action. This movement
has now been brought to a halt and the foundation has been laid
for a movement back to the more orthodox view of standing.
Evolution of a New Test
In Warth v. Seldin6 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,7 Justice Powell's opinions established preced-
ent that will enable the Court to avoid suspending judgment when
dubious plaintiffs fail to flesh out conclusory allegations in their
complaints. His opinions were foreshadowed in Linda R.S. v. Ri-
chard D.,71 where a mother of an illegitimate child sued a Texas
district attorney for not prosecuting the child's father. State officials
had been prosecuting only fathers of legitimate children for their
refusal to provide for the support and maintenance of children
under eighteen years of age. The mother's action presented an equal
protection clause issue, but the Court never reached the merits. Mr.
Justice Marshall explained that the plaintiff made no showing that
her failure to secure support payments resulted from the non-
enforcement of the Texas statute making non-support a misde-
meanor.7 1 Moreover, he noted it would be speculative to assume that
the requested relief would redound to her benefit."0 Thus, the Court
concluded that "the 'direct' relationship between the alleged injury
and the claim sought to be adjudicated, which. . . is a prerequisite
of standing, is absent .... ,,8, Because the case did not involve the
federal Administrative Procedure Act, but arose in the unique con-
text of a challenge to prosecutorial discretion, it was not generally
understood that the decision was a harbinger of a tightening up of
the nexus requirement between the wrong and the injury across the
76. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
77. 96 S.Ct. 1917 (1976).
78. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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board-especially since S.C.R.A.P. was decided three and one-half
months after Linda.
However, prior to the most recent opinions of Mr. Justice Powell,
there were decisions that denied standing during the very years the
Court seemed preoccupied with liberalizing standing. The Court in
Sierra Club v. Morton2 had tried to make it clear that a plaintiff's
abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudi-
cation does not substitute for the Court's requirement of a concrete
injury. The Court held in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis8 3 that a black
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a club's membership practices
because he had not applied for or been denied membership. In Laird
v. Tatum, 84 the plaintiffs' complaint that army surveillance of citi-
zens chilled their first amendment rights was dismissed for want of
a justiciable controversy. The plaintiffs, according to the majority,
had failed to allege the chilling effect was caused by specific action
of the army against them." Furthermore, they failed to allege the
threat of specific future harm. 81 In Roe v. Wade,87 the Court held
that a childless married couple had no standing to challenge state
abortion laws since the wife was not pregnant. In O'Shea v.
Littleton,8" the Court held a complaint that defendant county offi-
cials engaged in "unconstitutional and selectively discriminatory
enforcement and administration of criminal justice" failed to allege
a case and controversy. The complaint was deficient inter alia be-
cause the claim was presented in the most general terms taking the
court into the areas of speculation and conjecture.
Despite these cases,88 the signal that the Court was not pre-
pared to further dilute standing requirements was not strong or
clear. Commentators noted that the majority in Sierra "expressly
disclaimed reliance upon the cases and controversies clause of
article III." ° Moose Lodge focused on the jus tertii problem. The
82. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
83. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
84. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
85. Id. at 13-14.
86. Id. at 14.
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
89. See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
90. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 236 (1972).
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O'Shea case presented comity and equity concerns. It also involved
the problem of prosecutorial discretion as did Linda. Roe v. Wade
has been interpreted as a ripeness opinion that was inadvertantly
flawed by its reliance on the law of standing.9' The Laird opinion
was based on the premise that the situation did not present the
plaintiff with any present or immediately threatened injury result-
ing from specific official action. None of these cases really clarified
the law of standing in situations where a plaintiff's opportunity to
obtain tangible benefits was stymied by governmental regulatory
activity outside of the military and criminal justice areas. How-
ever, the cases of Warth v. Seldin and Simon did involve issues
where plaintiffs arguably were denied opportunities and tangible
benefits which they alleged resulted from unlawful government reg-
ulation. It is to those cases that I now turn.
Warth v. Seldin
In Warth, the Court elaborated on the theme of Linda as well as
the variations of the standing doctrine discussed in the other Su-
preme Court cases that denied standing since Flast. Justice Powell
established a new starting point which may yet evolve into a coher-
ent body of law answering the question: Who is a proper party
plaintiff? There were four different groups of plaintiffs in Warth.
One group of plaintiffs consisted of low and moderate income indi-
viduals who resided outside of the town of Penfield. They claimed
Penfield's zoning ordinance and zoning practices had prevented per-
sons of low and moderate income from acquiring residential prop-
erty in the town. However, these plaintiffs did not allege there was
a substantial probability that they personally would be able to ob-
tain residential property in town if the Court granted them the relief
sought. As Justice Powell read their complaint, and affidavits filed
in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sug-
gested their inability to obtain housing in Penfield was the
consequence of the "economics of the area housing market" as op-
posed to the defendants' zoning practices. 3 Thus, by their own ad-
mission, Powell noted, realization of their desires to live in Penfield
91. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1381 (1973).
92. 422 U.S. 490, 503-07(1975).
93. Id. at 506.
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always has depended on the efforts of third parties. 4 No plaintiff
alleged that he had any specific project in mind or that there was
any builder willing to construct a house which fit his needs and
which he could afford. 5 These omissions to assert a sufficiently
demonstrable and concrete injury proved fatal. The plaintiffs were
denied access to federal court for two reasons: (1) the facts alleged
failed to support an actionable causal relationship between
Penfield's zoning practices and the plaintiffs asserted injury" and
(2) the plaintiffs had not demonstrated they personally would bene-
fit in a tangible way from federal court intervention. The fact that
the plaintiffs shared attributes common to persons excluded from
residence in the town was insufficient to support a conclusion that
the defendant violated the plaintiff's rights. It therefore appears
that, except in unusual cases, a plaintiff attacking an exclusionary
zoning ordinance in federal court should focus the court's attention
on a particular contemplated project. For implied in the interstices
of the opinion is the principle of law that no "legal" cause between
a zoning ordinance and an alleged exclusion can be established by
a non-resident plaintiff, not subject to the strictures of a town's
zoning ordinance, if he has taken no specific practical steps to ob-
tain housing. The bare allegation by a plaintiff that he has looked
for housing located in the town where he wants to live and has not
found suitable housing he can afford is insufficient to demonstrate
the official action proximately caused the plaintiff's exclusion. To
be sure, the Court's opinion is couched in terms of standing rather
than the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action but, as in this
case, the two concepts are often organically related. The opinion, by
specifying the grounds on which standing was denied, may well
prevent erroneous decisions on the merits and will encourage nar-
rower, better focused decisions.
A second group of plaintiffs consisted of Rochester taxpayers.
Their complaint was also insufficiently specific in alleging a "line
of causation"9 between Penfield's zoning practices and their higher
94. Id. at 505.
95. Id. at 503-07.
96. Id. at 507.
97. Id. at 508.
98. Id. at 502.
99. Id. at 509.
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taxes. Since the requisite causal connection between the asserted
wrong and their injury was conjectural,lm article III limitations
barred their access to the federal courts. It is doubtful that a tax-
payer qua taxpayer in one community has any personal constitu-
tional rights to be free of governmental action in a neighboring
municipality that has some incidental harmful effect upon his tax
liability.'"' Moreover, according to the Court, the plaintiff taxpayers
were asserting the rights of legal interests of third parties with whom
they had no substantial relationship. 10 Since none of the exceptions
to the prudential rule forbidding the assertion of constitutional jus
tertii was pleaded"°3 or evident, the Court discerned no reason to
recognize the Rochester taxpayers' standing.
Another plaintiff, Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc. (Metro-Act), as-
serted the rights of its members including members living in Pen-
field who were deprived of the social benefits of living in a racially
and ethnically integrated community."4 But unlike the plaintiffs in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., "o Metro-Act did not
assert any rights or entitlements created by Congress. Powell
concluded prudential considerations governed.'0 ' The Court blocked
the access of these litigants pressing social reform because their
deprivation of social benefits was perceived to be an indirect result
of the harm sustained by those excluded.0 7 Thus, the canon of re-
straint that often bars plaintiffs asserting constitutional jus tertii
was again applicable.
As to the prayer for prospective relief submitted by the intervenor
Home Builders, this too failed.' Home Builders alleged the de-
fendants' zoning restrictions deprived Home Builder's members of
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 509-10.
103. Id. Compare Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976).
104. Id. at 512.
105. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
106. 422 U.S. at 514.
107. Id.
108. The plaintiff Home Builders also claimed damages in the amount of $750,000. The
Court held that "each member of Home Builders who claims injury as a result of respondents'
practices must be a party to the suit, and Home Builders has no standing to claim damages
on his behalf." Id. at 516.
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"'substantial business opportunities and profits' ,." However, its
complaint referred to no specific, viable project that was precluded
at the time the lawsuit was filed. '10 Powell concluded, therefore, that
Home Builders and another plaintiff, the Housing Council, had not
shown "the existence of any injury of sufficient immediacy and
ripeness to warrant judicial intervention.""'
One commentator has said the "effect of the Warth holding is to
alter the nature of the injury necessary to create justiciability from
a loss of opportunity to actual denial of access to existing or planned
housing.""' However, it seems, this interpretation reads too much
substantive law into a decision on standing. Justice Powell carefully
kept his options open to subject all exclusionary zoning laws to
judicial review in a proper case.113 Surely the loss of a meaningful
opportunity in which plaintiff has a particularized personal interest,
under some circumstances, may be a proper case if judicial inter-
vention can remedy the harm."4
It has been suggested that the Court "implicitly declined to read
the Constitution as guaranteeing a right to live in an integrated
community."" '5 This is misleading. First of all, a court, when it
denies standing, is not likely to announce the existence of a new
constitutional right. Furthermore the plaintiff's (Metro-Act) com-
plaint in Warth alleged the defendants' zoning practices prevented
its members from living in a community with low and moderate
income groups which, in turn, had the effect of depriving its mem-
bers of the benefits of living in an integrated community."' The
Court correctly noted that those nonresidents indirectly injured had
failed to allege that any of the exceptions to the normal jus tertii
rule were operative.'1 7 Therefore, I do not read the opinion to say
that nonresidents can never have standing to complain of purpose-
ful discrimination aimed at others which interferes with a substan-
tial relationship between the plaintiff and others who are also in-
jured."'
109. Id. at 515, citing Brief for Appellant at 156.
110. See 422 U.S. at 516.
111. Id. at 516.
112. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 47, 191 (1975).
113. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
114. Id. at 504-08.
115. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47 (1975).
116. See 422 U.S. at 512.
117. Id. at 514.
118. See 422 U.S. at 514 n.22.
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Another criticism of the Warth opinion is Professor Davis' lament
that no builder should be forced to plan a specific project when it
is cheaper to attack an unconstitutional ordinance. He asks,
"[W]hy should they lack standing to challenge the ordinance that
prevents them from doing what they seek to do for business advan-
tage?" ' The answer is that the Court merely did not hold Home
Builders and Housing Council lacked standing; the Court declined
to decide the merits because the issue presented was not ripe, and
because of prudential reasons. 20 In Warth, by invoking the ripeness
doctrine, the Court was careful not to fuse two distinct but related
doctrines'12 but kept them isolated from one another, as well as it
reasonably could-given their close affinity.' 22
Of course the Warth opinion is disappointing for those, like Pro-
fessor Davis, who want the Court to decide any reviewable case
where the case and controversy requirements are met.1 23 But
Professor Davis' approach to standing, while more liberal than the
Court's, is basically a one dimensional view. The Davis view over-
looks the prudential considerations that are part of the whole ball
of wax presented by a constitutional case.2 4 Powell was careful in
Warth, as he was in Richardson, to emphasize and distinguish as
best he could between constitutional limitations and prudential
119. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-4, at 495-96 (1976). But see
id. § 22.21, at 522.
120. 422 U.S. at 516-17.
121. Powell pointed out on the standing issue that an association has no standing to sue
as a representative of its members if the issues presented by the members' grievances are not
ripe. Id. at 516.
122. Id. at 499. The question of ripeness focuses attention primarily on the nature of the
issues rather than the adequacy of plaintiff's stake in the controversy. However, on occasion
there is a reciprocal relationship between the fitness of the issues and the plaintiff's injury.
For example, if the harm to the plaintiff is contingent on future events that may never occur,
the issues may not be well developed or concretely presented. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
128 (1973); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). On the other hand, if the plaintiff has no
sufficiently distinctive personal interest in the controversy, the issues presented are likely to
be too abstract to illuminate difficult questions of law. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).
Moreover, the close affinity between ripeness and the plaintiff's stake in the controversy is
evident in cases in which the courts evaluate "both the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In short, standing and ripeness cannot always be
separated into two watertight compartments.
123. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.00, at 486 (1976).
124. Professor Davis' discussion of Richardson and Warth largely ignores the prudential
consideration discussed in Justice Powell's opinions. See id. § 22.02-4, at 493-96, § 22.02-7,
at 499-501.
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considerations. Even in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization,'25 where he relied solely on article III limitations,
Powell helps us distinguish between the constitutional prohibitions
and the self imposed canons of constraint. In this respect, no one,
including Professor Davis, has contributed more common sense to
the law of standing.
Simon was a suit brought against the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by several indigents and
organizations representing indigents. Plaintiffs asserted that the
Internal Revenue Service violated the Internal Revenue Code and
the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing a revenue ruling in
196925 that allowed favorable tax treatment to a non-profit hospital
which offered only emergency services to indigents. The plaintiffs
submitted affidavits recounting incidents in various parts of the
country where indigents were denied hospital services by institu-
tions enjoying tax exempt status as "charitable" organizations. The
plaintiffs' prayer for relief requested the district court to declare the
1969 ruling invalid and to enjoin its implementation.1 2 The Court
held the plaintiffs lacked standing because the requested exercise
of judicial power would be inconsistent with the case and
controversies requirement of article m1I.'
The plaintiffs were denied standing in part because they failed to
establish a crucial causal link between the claimed injury and the
asserted wrong. The plaintiffs claimed the 1969 ruling "encouraged"
hospitals to deny services which allegedly deprived the indigents of
their opportunity and ability to receive the charitable benefits con-
templated by the Internal Revenue Code. 29 However, the Court
concluded it was purely speculative whether the "denials of service
specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'en-
couragement'.' '3 The missing link in the plaintiffs' case was their
125. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
126. Rev. Rul. 545, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 117.
127. The district court concluded the plaintiffs had standing to sue and granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973). The court of appeals
reversed on the merits. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to dismiss the complaint. 96 S. Ct. at 1928.
128. 96 S. Ct. at 1924.




failure to allege facts supportive of a fairly drawn inference that
some hospitals enjoying the tax advantage would admit indigents
at reduced charges (1) if the IRS ruling were rescinded or (2) if a
court required a reduced charge admission as a condition for the
favorable tax treatment afforded by the ruling.'3 ' The Court also
noted that no hospital denying service was a defendant,'3 2 and con-
cluded the complaint suggested no substantial likelihood that the
requested relief, if granted, would result in the desired hospital
services for indigents.133 The fact that plaintiffs brought this action
under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and pursuant
to the Declaratory Judgment Act did not and could not cure the
article II defects in their complaint. 4 In sum, the Court held the
plaintiffs failed to establish their standing to sue because the re-
quested relief, if ordered, was inconsistent with the article I cases
and controversies limitation upon federal court jurisdiction.
Powell's recognition that plaintiff's standing is a distinct aspect
of the cases and controversies requirement is a helpful clarification
of what has often been a confusing meld.35 Moreover, he does not
consider every disadvantage to be an injury in fact for article III
purposes. He also recognizes, however, that the inability of the
Court to give meaningful relief can be so patent that it amounts to
more than a prudential limitation but becomes a problem with
constitutional dimensions.'3 1 In such circumstances, any judicial
decision on the merits would be tantamount to an advisory opinion
which is the best established example of decision-making beyond
the outer boundaries of judicial power.'3 1 Moreover, the Powellian
corollary that courts are without power to decide questions when it
is patent that it cannot give meaningful relief is consistent with
Justice Powell's conviction that in some cases the pure standing
requirements bear a close affinity with the ripeness'38 doctrine in
its purely constitutional dimension. However, had Justice Powell
decided Simon purely on the basis of the ripeness doctrine, the
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1925.
133. Id. at 1926-28.
134. Id. at 1924-25.
135. No longer can one question if a personalized injury in fact a core constitutional ingre-
dient. See note 3 supra.
136. 96 S. Ct. at 1928.
137. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1535 (9th ed. 1975).
138. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975).
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Court's signal that it was returning to the more orthodox view of
standing would not have been clear.
The precedent Justice Brennan relied on to support his attack on
Powell's concept of standing was the line of cases citing section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act as a vehicle to liberalize the
law of standing.'39 Justice Brennan convincingly demonstrates that
the Simon matter presented a line of causation no less attenuated
than S.C.R.A.P.'4 ° However, his dissent will probably accelerate
S.C.R.A.P. 's demise as a viable precedent. The injuries alleged in
S.C.R.A.P. do not meet all of Powell's requirements. Indeed, Pow-
ell, who did not take any part in the consideration of S. C.R.A.P.,
noted that the S.C.R.A.P. allegations might not have survived a
motion for summary judgment."' Possibly S.C.R.A.P. may be cited
as a makeweight in some cases, but as Professor Davis notes,'
O'Shea,' Linda' and Warth4 reflect an attitude that cannot be
reconciled with the attitude in the S. C.R.A.P.'4 opinion as to what
is a sufficient injury in fact. Thus it would appear that S. C.R.A.P.
is the aberration and that Justice Powell's opinions in Richardson,'47
Warth'48 and Simon' are in the mainstream.
Conclusion
The stricter standing requirements articulated by Justice Powell
are a sound and logical means to assess the adequacy of a plaintiffs
stake in a controversy. The Powellian standards distinguish be-
tween the abstract injury and the identifiably perceptible injury
which is the subject matter of traditional lawsuits geared to a sys-
tem of private law claims. No longer can the de minimis injury, or
the injury not fairly traceable to an asserted wrong, serve as a pre-
139. See notes 46-75 supra and accompanying text.
140. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
141. 96 S. Ct. at 1927 n.25, citing United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.15
(1973).
142. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-3, at 491 (1976).
143. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
144. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
145. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
146. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
147. 418 U.S. 166, 180-97 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).
148. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
149. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
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text for special interest groups to vindicate what they say is in the
public interest. Powell articulates what the minimal essential arti-
cle III requirements are, and yet provides for flexibility by candidly
admitting the function prudential considerations serve in causes
where the plaintiff's standing is at issue."'0 He also recognizes that
to an extent Congress can strip away "judicially created overlays'1
5 '
by designating private attorneys general who are injured in fact to
vindicate the public interest in cases and controversies. As Powell
noted, his objections to public actions (particularly his separation
of power concerns) are ameliorated by congressional mandate.
51
By way of summary, the standing limitation is an aspect of the
cases and controversies requirement, but it also serves as a means
to avoid deciding a case when prudential considerations so dictate.
For article III purposes, standing rules focus on the nature and
extent of plaintiff's injury. The question is whether the record indi-
cates plaintiff has been injured in fact. The injury in fact concept
consists of three elements: (1) a distinct disadvantage, economic or
otherwise, which is not deemed de minimis or abstract, (2) a sub-
stantial probability that the disadvantage was caused by the de-
fendant's alleged breach of duty and (3) the existence of a judicial
remedy which will remove the disadvantage in a meaningful way.
The plaintiff's injury in fact can occur in three ways: (1) from
private damage resulting from a common law wrong, (2) from the
expenditure of his taxes pursuant to a taxing and spending statute
contrary to the establishment clause and (3) from defendant's viola-
tion of positive law (such as a statutory or constitutional provision)
causing remediable damage. However with respect to the latter, if
the plaintiff's injury is deemed a generalized grievance, shared in
common by all citizens, the federal courts will consider it an article
III injury only if the plaintiff is adversely affected in some special
way. A line is drawn between the purely ideological, abstract injury
sustained by the polity and the private injury which in some con-
crete manner disadvantages the plaintiff. A plaintiff's interest in
law enforcement for its own sake is an example of an abstract ideo-
150. See Singleton v. Wulff, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) and note 147, supra.
151. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n.18 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring), citing G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106
(8th ed. 1970).
152. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n.18 (1974)(Powell, J., concurring).
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logical' interest. A plaintiff's special interest in aesthetic, environ-
mental or even spiritual matters, however, may be legally cogniza-
ble if the court's order can benefit him in some specific noticeable
way. Notwithstanding the principle that some generalized griev-
ances are considered to be article III injuries, the federal courts
retain discretion not to recognize plaintiff's standing to sue unless
the legislature authorizes him to bring an action to vindicate the
public interest. In such cases, the plaintiff's injury in fact must
relate to an interest arguably protected or regulated by relevant
positive law. The foregoing is implicit in Powell's opinions clarifying
the law of standing.15 3
Powell's product should prove more durable and workable than
either the Flast test or the S. C.R.A.P. approach. The Powell test is
amenable to principled neutral application. The test screens out the
National Association of Manufacturers as well as groups that repre-
sent indigents when such plaintiffs fail to meet its relatively strict
requirements. The only institution that may derive a dispropor-
tionate benefit from the fair application of the test is the judiciary;
it can expound controversial doctrines of constitutional and admin-
istrative law at a pace which it believes to be politically acceptable.
If the Powellian test is not abused, or used as a pretext to beg
questions the courts have a duty to decide; the test is merely a
descendant of a venerable tradition. While Mr. Justice Powell has
not reconciled all the conflicting emanations from the last decade's
cases under his generalizations, those who appreciate his contribu-
tion can take comfort in the truth that the law is always approach-
ing consistency, never reaching it.' 54 I submit Mr. Justice Powell's
standing is first rank.
153. Recently Justice Powell had occasion to summarize the essence of the recent Supreme
Court cases clarifying the law of standing. He wrote in Arlington Heights:
The essence of the standing question, in its constitutional dimension, 'is whether the
plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
remedial powers on his behalf.' . . . The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured
by the challenged action of the defendant. The injury may be direct, . . . but the
complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's
acts or omissions.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 4073, 4076
(U.S. Jan. 11, 1977) (citations omitted).
154. B. CARDOZO, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO 171 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
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